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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has often been attributed to wide-spread opacity of financial claims.
From a theoretical point of view the amount of intransparency was staggering. A more transpar-
ent financial system should not only allow for funds to be directed to the most efficient projects,
but it should also reduce the informational asymmetry between informed issuers and potentially
uninformed buyers of financial claims. Starting with Akerlof (1970) a large body of literature
has argued that from an ex-ante perspective, a seller would be best off by disclosing as much
information as possible in order to guarantee symmetric information.
We show that this need not be the case if an issuer of financial claims is concerned about his
access to alternative sources of funding. Instead, an issuer of claims may want to restrict infor-
mation disclosure, even if doing so increases informational asymmetries between the contracting
parties. While this insight may be surprising from a theoretical point of view, it is in line with a
large number of stylized facts that suggest that agents on financial markets choose to obfuscate
information on a regular basis. Most importantly, our model may explain why certain claims
such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) on subprime mortgages were structured in a
highly opaque fashion, while issuers of other claims disclose much more information.
In the US alone, the value of outstanding CDOs reached more than US$1.3 trillion in 2007.1
There seems to be a wide-spread believe that these claims were structured in ways that made
them considerably more opaque than their underlying assets. More specifically, it is often sug-
gested that the process of bundling and tranching a large number of different claims made CDOs
more intransparent than necessary. In its 2010 proposal to revise the disclosure regulations for
Asset Backed Securities, including CDOs, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
argued that “...in many cases, investors did not have the information necessary to understand
and properly analyze structured products...” and suggests that these financial products could
indeed have been made more transparent. Hence, the SEC seems to believe that opacity was
not only an important problem, but was also a choice rather than a technological necessity.
Our model predicts that the incentives to voluntarily withhold information should be largest
in sectors where there are significant limits to how much information a borrower can disclose. If
1Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2012)
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a borrower is highly constrained in the maximal level of information that he can disclose, then
he may react by reducing transparency even below the technologically feasible level. This could
explain why opaque financial instruments were particularly popular in market segments that
are inevitably subject to considerable informational frictions, such as the market for subprime
mortgages.2
However, selling CDOs that are backed by a portfolio of mortgages is only one particular
way in which banks may generate opaque claims. Alternatively, banks may raise funding by
issuing bonds that are backed by the bank itself. To the extent that a bank does not disclose
all information necessary to understand the riskiness of its balance sheet, these bonds may also
be opaque. The facts that the balance sheet of banks are inherently intransparent and that
banks do not disclose all of the information that could be communicated to investors is widely
acknowledged in the literature.
We consider a model in which a bank is endowed with a profitable investment opportunity
that can be set up at arbitrary scale and may be more or less profitable. The bank finds it
optimal to invest its own capital into the project regardless of the project’s type. On top of
that, it may want to to borrow funds from financial institutions that have excess liquidity (e.g.
other banks or shadow banks) to increase the scale of the investment. The borrowing bank will
do so by selling claims on the project’s future cash-flow. There are two kinds of lenders that
the borrower can sell claims to. Some lenders are able to obtain information on the quality
of the investment project (e.g. by performing due diligence), while others do not possess any
payoff-relevant information.
An informed lender who has evaluated the investment opportunity receives a non-verifiable,
imperfect signal on the quality of the claim. In order to make it incentive compatible for the
informed lender to reveal this signal truthfully, it is optimal to agree that the lender will buy
claims at a pre-specified price if and only if he has received favorable information on the project.
Otherwise the borrower has to turn to a spot market comprised of uninformed lenders. However,
at this point in time the borrower has obtained information on the quality of his project and
the market is subject to asymmetric information. Hence, the fact that the borrower may have
2Portfolios of subprime mortgages tend to be hard to value for outside investors since it is generally hard to
asses the precise underwriting standards that a bank has used when approving such mortgages.
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to resort to a spot market may give rise to an inefficiency.
Let us now consider the effect of transparency. On the spot market claims will always trade
at a discount since uninformed lenders know that they face an adverse selection of projects.
Moreover, if uninformed lenders expect claims to be of very low quality this may give rise to a
“market for lemons”. The price for claims that is offered on the spot market is so low that a
borrower with a good project who ends up in need of spot market financing (i.e., who has received
a negative evaluation) no longer finds it worthwhile to sell any claims. This is inefficient since
it sharply reduces the scale at which some of the most efficient projects are implemented. This
kind of market breakdown becomes more likely the more information an informed lender obtains.
Highly transparent financial claims reduce the probability that an informed lender misjudges the
quality of a project and reduces the likelihood that good claims end up being offered on the spot
market. Hence, the stigma of offering claims on the spot market increases and uninformed
lenders offer lower prices, which may trigger a market freeze. Designing intransparent claims
convinces uninformed lenders that they are not at a large informational disadvantage vis-à-vis
an informed lender. This can ensure market liquidity and may hence be desirable.
However, intransparency comes at a cost. It increases the price that a borrower with a
negative evaluation can obtain for his claims on the spot market, but it reduces the price that
borrowers with a positive evaluation obtain from an informed lender. This reduces the scale at
which projects of a high expected quality can be set up and increases the scale at which the less
profitable projects are financed. This cost in terms of a reduction in the allocative efficiency of
the financial sector can be substantial. However, it is smaller for projects where the borrower is
highly constrained in the amount of information that he can disclose to begin with. Moreover,
for such projects a market breakdown is particularly costly. Even if the borrower discloses as
much information as he possibly can, there is still a large probability that high quality projects
will end up in need of spot market funding and will be affected by the spot market breakdown.
This implies that we should expect to find voluntary opacity in those market segments where
information disclosure will necessarily be highly imperfect.
In a second part of the paper, we consider government interventions that are aimed at
ensuring the liquidity of spot markets. Our model of optimal opacity gives us a good framework
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to consider the implication that such interventions may have on the incentives for information
disclosure. The intervention we consider resembles the initial plans for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) in that the government offers to buy claims on the spot market at an
expected loss. By doing so the government effectively subsidizes trade on the spot market and
ensures that the market remains liquid even for high levels of transparency.3 We refer to this
as ’market support’. From an ex-ante perspective offering market support may be desirable
since it encourages borrowers to adopt more transparent financial structures. This increases the
allocative efficiency of the financial sector and can increase welfare as long as the government
guarantees the liquidity of the spot market. However, there are also situations in which borrowers
can choose levels of transparency that are excessive from the point of view of a social planner in
order to force the government into offering support ex-post. The government may want to avoid
such hold-up problems by committing ex-ante not to intervene. This is consistent with concerns
about about ex-ante moral hazard that market support may create.
Relation to the Literature
The paper closely relates to the literature on market liquidity: Dang, Gorton and Holmström
(2009) present a model in which information acquisition is harmful since it generates asymmetric
information. In their model nobody knows anything about the quality of a claim unless he
acquires information. Hence, by preventing information acquisition the designer of a claim can
preserve symmetric ignorance. Our model differs from Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2009) in
three important aspects: First, we assume that the issuer of a claim will always learn the quality
of his claim perfectly. Hence, withholding information increases informational asymmetries
between the borrower and (partially informed) lenders. Second, we explicitly consider the effects
of opacity on allocative efficiency. Third, we model transparency as a continuos variable, which
allows us to obtain a rich set of policy implications. In particular, our model predicts how
3In its initial plans for the Troubled Asset Relief Program the US Treasury planned to buy certain so-
called "troubled" assets at an expected loss rather than to inject equity into failing banks. Similar programs
(the "Commercial Paper Funding Facility" and the "Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility") were later
implemented by the Federal Reserve Bank. While these programs were arguably not intended to make any
losses, they did provide liquidity to purchase Commercial Papers and Asset Backed Securities and may have had
a positive effect on their price.
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the choice to withhold information is related to the amount of information that borrower could
disclose. Pagano and Volpin (2012) show that opacity can be desirable since it makes it more
difficult for sophisticated investors to learn the quality of a claim, which reduces informational
asymmetries between different classes of investors. However, they assume that the issuer of a
claim can not condition the decision to sell claims on any information he has on the quality of the
claim. Hence, informational asymmetries between the borrower and investors are unproblematic
by assumption.4 Malherbe (2014) shows that expectations of a market breakdown can be self-
fulfilling. Hence, market liquidity may depend not only on fundamentals but also on beliefs.
Finally, Alvarez and Barlevy (2013) show that if information disclosure is costly and there is
scope for contagion, banks may invest too little into information disclosure since they do not
internalize the positive spillovers that their disclosure decision has on other banks.
The fact that losing funding from a well-informed lender carries a stigma is well established
in the literature. The relationship banking literature (see, e.g., Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990; von
Thadden, 1995) shows that this may create hold-up problems since lenders can use their infor-
mation monopoly to extract rents from entrepreneurs. Ways to address this problem include
entertaining multiple banking relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2000) or using more sophisti-
cated contractual arrangements (von Thadden, 1995).5 The effect we consider in this model
is considerably different and exists even if the potential hold-up problem has been solved by
appropriate contracts.
In the second part of the paper we consider possible government interventions. Our model
of government interventions in markets with asymmetric information builds on a recent body
of literature initiated by Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012), who analyze optimal
mechanisms by which a government can ensure the liquidity of a market hampered by asymmetric
information. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the effects that such interventions
can have on the ex-ante incentives to disclose information.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 formulates the baseline model and
4A similar situation is considered by Bignon and Breton (2004) who discuss how imprecise accounting rules
can reduce informational asymmetries between investors and, hence, lower the cost of raising capital. Burkhardt
and Strausz (2009) show that opaque accounting rules may be desirable even if they reduce the liquidity of
secondary markets since this can solve commitment problems.
5A related rationale for multiple banking relationships is put forward by Detragiache, Garella and Guiso
(2000). In their model single banks are fragile and may fail to supply credit.
6
Section 3 derives the optimal financial contracts. Section 4 analyses the benefits of opacity in
this framework. In a second part of the paper, we build on our previous results to consider
the effects of government interventions in the spot market on the incentives for information
disclosure. The final section summarizes the results and concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a setting with two classes of risk-neutral financial institutions. (Shadow) banks
that have excess funds, which we refer to as lenders, and banks that are in need of funding and
which we refer to as borrowers.6
A representative borrower B, is endowed with some limited amount of capital A and an
investment project that can be set up at an arbitrary scale S ∈ R+. We can think of this
investment opportunity as a large-scale project for which the bank may want to raise additional
funds on a wholesale market. Each unit of investment has a cost of $1 and will generate future,
non-pledgable income of ρnp. This income can not be promised to outside investors and may
include information rents that have to be left to the borrower and its management to provide
appropriate incentives. With probability θi the investment will generate financial returns ρp that
can be pledged to outside investors. The probability that a project is commercially successful
depends on the type of the project: i ∈ {H,L} where θH > θL. We denote the probability of a
project being of high type (i.e. i = H) by α.
There are two kinds of lenders: Informed lenders who are able to obtain some information
on the borrower’s type and uninformed lenders who do not have access to any payoff-relevant
information. We assume that there is a large supply of both kinds of lenders and that lenders are
perfectly competitive. Moreover, lenders do not face any capital constraints. An informed lender
can evaluate the quality of the investment opportunity and receives a non-verifiable, imperfect
signal s ∈ {H,L} on the project’s type. This allows him to offer B different terms of financing
depending on the outcome of the evaluation process. Uninformed lenders on the other hand
6While we typically think of banks as lenders, at any given point in time a bank may have more investment
opportunities than it has liquidity available and may approach other (shadow) banks in order to obtain additional
funds, e.g. by securitizing parts of its loan portfolio.
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do not obtain any information. For simplicity, we assume that the borrower can only sign a
contract with one informed lender.7
The timing of the game can be described by three periods: In t = 0 B does not yet posses
any information on the type of his project and can secure funding for the upcoming investment
opportunity by signing an ex-ante contracts with an informed lender. In t = 1, after learning the
quality of his investment opportunity, the borrower can obtain additional funds from uninformed
lenders on a spot market and has to make his investments.8 At t = 2 uncertainty is resolved,
projects are terminated and creditors are repaid.
1) B chooses e.
2) B signs ex-ante contract.
1) B observes i.
2) Lender observes s.
3) Lender announces sˆ.
1) Spot market opens.
2) B accepts spot market offer (if any).
3) B invests.
Projects mature.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure 1: Timing of the Game.
Let us consider period 0 in more detail: At this point B knows that he will need funds
for an upcoming investment opportunity in t = 1, but he is not yet able to assess the type of
the project. He can costlessly choose the level of financial transparency e from some interval
(0, E] where E < 1. His choice of e is publicly observable. We will describe the consequences
of the borrower’s choice of transparency below. Once he has chosen his level of transparency,
the borrower can sign a contract with an informed lender. A contract with an informed lender
can be characterized by a tuple (qH , dH , qL, dL) where qsˆ describes the amount of funding that
a borrower receives in period 1 and dsˆ describes the repayment that the lender in entitled to in
period 2. Both of these quantities depend on a report sˆ ∈ {H,L} that the lender makes about
his non-verifiable information.9 At the time of signing the contract the borrower only knows
7This assumption is without loss of generality if the private signals of different lenders are perfectly correlated.
If lenders use similar technologies to evaluate the quality of a claim it is indeed reasonable to assume that their
signals will be very closely correlated.
8In Section 3.2 we will see that the assumption that trade with uninformed lenders takes place in period 1 is
without loss of generality.
9We assume that for any given sˆ the lender offers a unique set of payments. Under weak assumptions on the
borrower’s behaviour this assumption is without loss of generality. In principal, a contract could specify a choice
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that the terms of funding will be either (qH , dH) or (qL, dL). After the contract has been signed
(but before the spot market opens) the informed lender receives his signal of the quality of the
project s and announces sˆ. It is only at this point that the borrower learns the exact conditions
at which he obtains funding. Throughout the paper, we assume that contracts are unobservable
to other lenders.
If the borrower chooses a more transparent structure, this enables the lender to evaluate the
quality of the claim with higher precision. For simplicity we assume that for any e we have
Prob(s = H ∩ i = L) = Prob(s = L ∩ i = H), i.e. the lender is equally likely to err in either
direction when assessing the type of a project. The probability of either type of misjudgment
is given by α(1 − α)(1 − e).10 For e = 0 the borrower does not disclose any information and
the signal is completely uninformative, while for e = 1 the probability of misjudgment would
become zero. However, the assumption that E < 1 implies that the lender never obtains such a
fully revealing signal.
In period 1 the borrower can obtain additional funds by trading on a spot market. An
important property of spot market trade is that the market is subject to asymmetric information.
Once the informed lender has evaluated the claim, the borrower has had time to learn the quality
of his project, while spot market lenders are perfectly uninformed. We assume that these
uninformed lenders compete in the interest rate rM where a lender is entitled to a repayment
of rM in period 2 for each dollar he lends in period 1.
11 Since a borrower can not pledge
any income to more than one lender, he can raise at most qM units of capital on this market
where
(
A+ qsˆ + qM
)
ρp = d
sˆ + qMrM .
12 Asymmetric information may be socially costly since
of two different financing terms for each report sˆ and have borrowers with different types select into different
options in period 1, once they have learned their own type. However, it may be reasonable to assume that
whenever both types of borrowers are indifferent between two options, they accept the same terms of financing.
In Appendix B we show that under this tie-breaking rule offering a unique set of payments is indeed optimal.
Moreover, in the interest of generality we allow informed lenders to offer {qsˆ, dsˆ} tuples. However, our results
remain unaffected if informed lenders can only specify a linear interest rate at which borrowers can obtain funds.
10The assumption of a linear relationship between Prob(s = j ∩ i = k) for j 6= k and e is without loss
of generality. More generally, assume that g(e) = Prob(s = j ∩ i = k). We only require that g′(e) < 0,
g(0) = α(1− α) and g(1) = 0.
11Note that Attar, Mariotti and Salanié (2011) show competition in linear prices to be indeed an equilibrium
under asymmetric information if borrowers can not commit to deal with only one lender. While there are other
equilibria, the equilibrium allocation is always unique.
12Since contracts are unobservable, the assumption that a borrower can be kept from pledging future income
to more than one borrower may not seem very natural. However, we can interpret this assumption as follows:
When dealing with any given lender, the borrower sets up a new special purpose vehicle and transfers some of his
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a borrower with a good project may decide not to sell claims on the spot market if he considers
the interest rate to be unduly high relative to the profits he can make if he does not take out any
loan and sets up the project using only his own capital A. At the end of period 1 the borrower
makes his investments and sets up the project at the desired scale S.
In the last period, uncertainty is resolved and the claims of creditors are fully honored
whenever the project is successful. If the project does not generate any financial return, the
borrower defaults on his obligations but is still able to enjoy the non-pledgable income ρnp.
For simplicity, we normalize the discount factor in the economy to one. Moreover, for the
rest of the paper, we impose the following parameter restrictions:
ρnp + θLρp > 1 (1)
θHρp < 1 (2)
These restrictions imply that while investing is always socially efficient (1), it is never possible
to set up a project using only debt (2). Hence, the size of any project is restricted by the amount
of capital A that a borrower can invest into it.
The key source of inefficiency in the model is the fact that an informed lender only receive soft
information on the quality of a project. If the lender could commit to reveal his signal truthfully,
a borrower would make available as much information as possible. He would sign a contract
that supplies him with a large, subsidized loan in case his project is likely to be of high quality
and that expropriates him in case his investment opportunity is likely to be bad. Moreover, he
would never need to turn to the spot market that is subject to asymmetric information. The
fact that the informed lender has to find it individually optimal to reveal his signal truthfully
introduces two restrictions: First, a lender can not offer a contract that subsidizes borrowers
with a favorable signal at the expense of borrowers that are likely to be of low quality. Otherwise,
he would always have an incentive to misreport his signal as being s = L. Even worse, in order
to give a lender incentives to report his signal truthfully, an optimal ex-ante contract does not
offer any credit to borrowers in case of a negative signal and these borrowers have to turn to
own funds to this entity. The lender in turn grants credit to this entity and obtains claims on all future cash-flow.
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the spot market instead.13 Hence, whenever the lender is to reveal his signal, it is impossible to
circumvent the spot market that is subject to asymmetric information. While it is possible to
design ex-ante contracts that supply the borrower with funding irrespective of sˆ, such contracts
can not make use of any of the informed lender’s information and turn out never to be optimal.
3 Equilibrium Contracts
3.1 The Spot Market
We start our analysis by looking at the spot market in period 1. In order to do so we assume
that only borrowers who have received a negative evaluation from the informed lender consider
selling claims on the period 1 market and that these borrowers do not obtain any credit at all
from the informed lender. In the next section we will see that this is without loss of generality.
Given that only borrowers with s = L end up on the spot market, B’s type can be fully
characterized by his true quality i ∈ {L,H}. While i is known to the borrower, it is unobservable
to the prospective lenders. Since lenders make zero profits, the interest rate that they demand for
buying claims in a project in given by rM = 1/θˆM where θˆM is the market’s rational expectation
of θ given that B decides to sell claims on the spot market.
The linear nature of the problem implies that a borrower on the spot market either does
not take out any loan at all or he borrows as much as possible. If he decides not to pledge any
future cash-flows to another bank, the size of his investment will be equal to his capital A and






This utility under self-financing is larger for borrowers that have a high-quality project.
If, on the other hand, the borrower decides to take out a loan, then he will take out as much
credit as possible. The total amount of credit that a borrower can obtain at a given interest
rate is implicitly defined by the feasibility constraint (A+ qM ) ρp = qMrM . This implies that
13In this respect the model is reminiscent of the literature on “up-or-out” clauses in labour contracts (e.g. Kahn
and Huberman, 1988). Similar clauses in financial contracts are also considered by von Thadden (1995).
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the borrower can invest at scale S = A+ qM =
A
1−ρpθˆM






When selling claims on the spot market he promises all pledgable income to uninformed lenders.
In exchange for this he can increase the scale of the project and hence his non-pledgable income.
Assume that both types i choose to take out a loan at t = 1. In this case the share of claims
traded on the spot market that are of high quality is given by the probability that a good project
receives a bad evaluation and ends up in need of spot market funding divided by the overall
probability of a project ending up in need of spot market funding:
αM =




α(1− α)(1− e) + [(1− α)− α(1− α)(1− e)]
= α(1− e)
The market’s rational expectation concerning a project’s quality is hence given by θˆM = αMθH+
(1−αM )θL. Whenever the average quality of borrowers on the spot market is sufficiently large,
(4) is larger than (3) irrespective of i and everybody does indeed participate in the t = 1 market.
However, this does not hold true once the average quality of borrowers on the spot market
drops below some threshold θ˜M . In this case lenders can no longer offer an interest rate that
allows them to break even and still induces high types to borrow. Instead, any borrower with
a good project chooses self-financing and we end up with a market for lemons where only low-
quality debtors take out loans and pay an interest rate of rM = 1/θL. The threshold θ˜M is
pinned down by the interest rate at which borrowers with high-quality projects are indifferent
between self-financing and taking out loans, which gives us
θ˜M = θH/(ρpθH + ρnp).
In order to concentrate on the most interesting case, we will impose the following two as-
sumptions throughout the rest of the paper:
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Assumption 1. The asymmetric information problem is “severe” relative to the surplus that
can be generated by investing:
θH
θL
> ρnp + θHρp.
Assumption 1 guarantees that θ˜M > θL. It implies that high types will not find it attractive
to take out a loan if they are taken to be of bad quality for sure and have to pay the corresponding
interest rate. Conversely, if θ˜M < θL the asymmetric information problem would be rather mild.
In this case the benefits of setting up the project at a larger scale would be sufficiently large
to justify paying very high interest rates and adverse selection would never turn out to be a
problem.
Assumption 2. The share of good projects α is sufficiently high:
ρnp + θHρp >
θH
αθH + (1− α)θL
.
This condition ensures that the spot market does not break down if uninformed lenders expect
to face a random selection of projects, i.e. θ˜M < αθH +(1−α)θL. Under these two assumptions
we can show that the spot market breaks down if and only if the level of transparency e exceeds
a certain threshold:
Lemma 1. There exists some level of transparency e˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that high types who end up










Proof. See the appendix.
The expected quality of borrowers who consider taking out loans on the spot market is
determined by two factors: The share of high-quality projects in the economy α and the quality
of information available to the informed lender. If the informed lender is very effective at
screening projects, uninformed lenders can be almost certain that any claims that end up being
sold on the spot market are of low quality and there is a large stigma attached to borrowing
on this market. Consequently, lenders demand a high interest rate and the spot market breaks
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down. However, limited information disclosure can ensure that the spot market works smoothly.
Opacity increases the portion of high types who end up in need of spot market financing. This
guarantees favourable interest rates and makes sure that in equilibrium high types do indeed
trade on this market. Hence, as long as the level of transparency does not exceed some threshold e˜
the spot market will remain liquid.14 Moreover, further reducing the level of transparency would
further reduce the interest rate paid by borrowers on the spot market.
We will see that in case the spot market does not break down, the borrower would always
prefer to be as transparent as possible. Nevertheless, it may pay for a borrower to choose
intransparent financial structures ex-ante in order to prevent a market freeze.
3.2 Optimal Ex-ante Contracts
Having lined out how the spot market for credit works, we can now turn to the ex-ante contract
that borrowers sign with an informed lender in period 0. For the time being, we will assume
that e is exogenously given in order to fix ideas. We will call borrowers on whom a lender has
received a positive signal (s = H) “approved” borrowers and those on whom a lender has received
a negative signal (s = L) “disapproved” borrowers.
Recall that an ex-ante contract specifies an amount of credit qsˆ that a borrower receives in
period 1 and a repayment dsˆ that he has to make in period 2, given that the informed lender
reports sˆ ∈ {L,H} as the outcome of the project evaluation. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the lender reports his signal truthfully in equilibrium, i.e. s = sˆ. Since the market
for ex-ante contracts is competitive we must have
α(dH θˆ
H
− qH) + (1− α)(dLθˆ
L
− qL) = 0 (5)
where θˆ
s





for all e > 0. At the same time, the lender must have an incentive to reveal his signal
14It is easy to check that θˆM (e˜) = θ˜M .
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truthfully, which requires that
dH θˆ
H





− qL ≥ dH θˆ
L
− qH . (7)
Additionally, the contract must be feasible, i.e. the borrower can not pledge more income to a
lender than the project can generate:
dsˆ ≤ ρp(A+ q
sˆ) ∀sˆ ∈ {H,L} (8)
We can check that constraint (6) must be binding in equilibrium. Otherwise, the lender
could offer a contract that makes slightly higher profits on disapproved borrowers and slightly
lower profits on approved borrowers. In expectation, this contract would transfer wealth towards
those borrowers that can invest their wealth into more efficient investment opportunities. Hence,
from an ex-ante perspective a borrower would strictly prefer this new contract. Moreover,
we can ignore the second truth-telling constraint and check that it is satisfied in any optimal
contract. Having summed up the relevant constraints that any contract must satisfy, we can
now characterize a set of ex-ante contracts that may be optimal:
Proposition 1. An optimal ex-ante contract will take either of the two following forms:
• It offers credit if and only if the lender has received a positive signal. Credit is priced fairly
and approved borrowers promise all pledgable income to the informed lender.






• It offers to fund borrowers irrespective of the signal s. All borrowers receive the same terms
of funding and promise all pledgable income to the informed lender.





for all sˆ ∈ {H,L}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lenders on the spot market rationally expect that they will only trade with disapproved
borrowers and charge a high interest rate that exceeds the cost of lending to approved borrowers.
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Hence, it is optimal for informed lenders to lend as much as possible to approved borrowers. At
the same time, the informed lender must have an incentive to report his signal s truthfully. One
way to achieve this is by offering a contract that makes zero profits on approved borrowers and
that grants no credit to disapproved borrowers. For this contract the informed lender has no
incentive to misreport a good signal as a bad one and borrowers with a negative evaluation can
turn to the spot market to obtain funding. Since the informed lender always makes zero profits
on approved borrowers he offers more advantageous conditions if the level of transparency is
higher and an approved borrower is more likely to have high quality projects.
Alternatively, the lender can offer funding to borrowers with an unfavorable rating, too. But
if he does so, he must grant them credit at advantageous conditions that do not reflect the
true risk of lending to them. Approved borrowers have to cover the corresponding losses via a
repayment that lies above the actuarially fair one. When misreporting a good signal as a bad one
the lender would lose out on the profits that he makes on approved borrowers in case he truthfully
reveals his information. Additionally, if disapproved borrowers receive subsidized credit there is
less the lender can gain by reporting to have received a bad signal. This explains why in general,
contracts under which approved borrowers cross-subsidize disapproved borrowers may ensure
that a lender has an incentive to reveal his information truthfully. The linear nature of the
borrower’s problem implies that if it is optimal to grant credit to disapproved borrowers, then it
is optimal to grant them as much credit as possible without violating the feasibility constraint
(8).15 In this case the truth-telling constraint requires the cross-subsidy from approved to
disapproved borrowers to be particularly high and financing conditions do not depend on the
lender’s signal at all.
So there are two types of contracts a borrower may sign. He either chooses a contract that
makes use of the lender’s soft information but that may leave the borrower in need of spot
market funding. Or he can sign a contract that never requires him to turn to a spot market that
may be subject to adverse selection. However, this kind of contract can not make use of the
lender’s information and offers the same terms of funding regardless of the lender’s information.
Which contract a borrower chooses clearly depends on the terms of trade offered on the spot
15We abstract from the knife-edge case in which the borrower is indifferent between a continuum of different
contracts stipulating different levels of qL. This simplification does not affect any of our results.
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markets. As we have seen in the last section, these terms depend on the borrower’s choice of
transparency, so for different levels of e a different ex-ante contract may be optimal.
Proposition 2. There exists a threshold eˆ ≥ e˜ such that
• if e ∈ (e˜, eˆ) the borrower signs an ex-ante contract that offers funding irrespective of s.
• if e /∈ (e˜, eˆ) he signs a contract that only offers funding in case the lender observes s = H.
Proof. See the appendix.
Interestingly there is no monotonic relationship between e and the appeal of either type of
contract. While a contract that conditions on the lender’s information is optimal for very small
and very high levels of transparency, for intermediate levels of e a contract that offers the same
conditions regardless of the lender’s information is optimal.
To understand why this is the case, let us look at the effects of transparency in more detail.
We denote the borrower’s expected utility in case he signs an ex-ante contract that only grants
credit in case of a positive signal by W (e). For e = 0 the informed lender’s signal is completely
uninformative. Hence, uninformed lenders offer the same conditions as informed ones and B’s
utility does not depend on the signal s. The same holds true for a contract that never exposes B
to the spot market. The borrower’s utility under this second kind of contract is therefore given
by W (0) and is independent of e.
First, consider the case where e ≤ e˜. In this case a spot market breakdown will never be an
issue. At the same time, transparency is beneficial since it allows the financial sector to direct
funds to the more efficient projects: Slightly increasing the scale of the more efficient projects
while reducing the scale of the less efficient ones would always be socially beneficial. Improved
transparency allows the banking sector to do just that. Since projects of approved borrowers
become increasingly likely to be of type i = H, an approved borrower can obtain higher prices
when pledging his future income to the informed lender and can use the additional funds to
increase the scale of his project. Disapproved borrowers on the other hand need to pay higher
interest rates on the spot market and, hence, need to reduce the size of their investments.16 This
16An additional advantage of information disclosure is that it increases the probability that good projects (i.e.






Figure 2: Welfare as a Function of Transparency.
implies that W ′(e) > 0. So for all e ∈ (0, e˜] we have W (e) > W (0) and signing a contract that
forces disapproved borrowers to turn to the spot market is optimal.17
Now consider the case where e > e˜. Once the level of transparency exceeds e˜, the spot
market breaks down and borrowers with good projects who end up on this market will not
take out a loan. Since borrowers bear the cost of this inefficiency, the borrower’s expected
utility W (e) drops discontinuously at e˜ (see Figure 2). This explains why signing a contract
that does not condition on the lender’s information and that guarantees a utility of W (0) may
instead be optimal. However, conditional on the spot market being frozen, the expected utility is
increasing in e again. Moreover, for e→ 1 it is always optimal to sign a contract that may leave
a borrower in need of spot market financing. If e→ 1 making use of the lender’s (very precise)
information has substantial benefits in terms of allocative efficiency. Moreover, even though a
market breakdown is inevitable, its costs are negligible. Screening by the informed lender is
almost perfect and very few good investment projects end up in need of spot market funding.
So the fact that these projects will only be implemented at a limited scale due to informational
asymmetries is not very costly from an ex-ante perspective. Note that the dotted line in Figure
2 describes welfare in a hypothetical scenario where all borrowers that do not receive funding
from an informed lender can be forced to trade on the spot market. Hence, the cost of a market
breakdown is given by the vertical distance between the dotted and the solid line.
Taken together, these observations imply that in relative terms, being exposed to the spot
17Since all pledgable income ends up with the lenders and lenders make zero profits, this efficiency gain of
transparency materializes in a larger average scale of the investment projects.
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market is most costly for an intermediate set of transparency levels (e˜, eˆ). In these cases it is
optimal to sign a contract that does not condition on the lender’s information but allows the
borrower to circumvent the spot market.18
Given the structure of optimal ex-ante contracts, it is easy to see that our assumption that
contracts with uninformed lenders are signed in period 1 is without loss of generality. Instead of
trading with uninformed lenders in period 0, a borrower might as well sign an ex-ante contract
that does not condition on sˆ. In either case he receives the same financing terms with certainty.19
We have seen that for a given level of transparency e, the borrower faces a choice between
foregoing all of the benefits of information disclosure by signing an ex-ante contract where
payments do not depend on sˆ or signing a contract that may force him to seek credit on a spot
market which is subject to asymmetric information. In the next section we allow the borrower
to choose his level of financial transparency. This enables the borrower to limit the amount
of information disclosure. If the information released to lenders is sufficiently imprecise, this
reduces the stigma attached to a borrower who has to resort to uninformed lenders and may
prevent a spot market breakdown.
4 Optimal Opacity
In this section we assume that the borrower can not only choose what kind of contract he signs,
but he can also choose the level of transparency of his project e, e.g. by structuring claims in a
more or less transparent fashion. Effectively, this allows a borrower to choose his preferred point
on the x-axis of Figure 2. However, there is still an upper bound E on the amount of information
that he can disclose. For the rest of the paper, we will restrict attention to the interesting case
where E > e˜. In this case, the lender faces a potential trade-off between increasing allocative
efficiency by disclosing more information and ensuring market liquidity.20
18We can show that the interval (e˜, eˆ) is non-empty if θL is sufficiently small relative to θH . If θL → (θH/(ρnp+
θHρp) − αθH)/(1 − α) low levels of transparency suffice to lead to a breakdown of the spot market. For these
levels of transparency a market breakdown is particularly costly and it is optimal to circumvent the spot market.
19Moreover, it is impossible to write a forward contract in which the borrower commits to trade with an
uninformed lender in case of a negative report since contracts with the informed lender are unobservable.
20It is easy to see that if E ≤ e˜ a borrower would always disclose as much information as possible and sign a
contract that may leave him in need of spot market funding.
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Proposition 3. If the borrower can choose the level of transparency from some interval (0, E]
he will always sign a contract that may leave him in need of spot market financing. There exists
a threshold E˜ ∈ (e˜, 1) such that
• if E > E˜ a borrower discloses as much information as possible: e = E.
• if E ≤ E˜ a borrower chooses to be less-than-perfectly transparent: e = e˜.
Proof. See the appendix.
If the borrower can choose the level of financial transparency, he will always sign a contract
that may leave him in need of spot market funding. This ensures that good projects receive
more generous funding than bad projects and good projects are implemented at a larger scale.
At the same time, by disclosing sufficiently coarse information, the borrower could always ensure
that the spot market remains liquid.
Now consider the level of transparency the borrower optimally chooses. If E is larger than
some threshold E˜, then it is possible to disclose very precise information which results in large
benefits in terms of allocative efficiency. Projects that are likely to be of high quality receive
generous terms of funding and can be set up at a large scale, while less profitable investments
are financed at a smaller scale. At the same time, while the spot market may break down
due to asymmetric information, the cost of a market breakdown is small since only few good
projects end up without funding in period 1. From an ex-ante perspective, the fact that these
borrowers will not take out any loans is not very costly. Hence, it is optimal to disclose as much
information as possible. But if E is small and screening is bound to be imprecise anyway, a
borrower optimally restricts transparency to reduce the stigma attached to turning to the spot
market. A low level of transparency convinces uninformed lenders that they are not at a large
informational disadvantage relative to informed lenders. Uninformed lenders are hence prepared
to lend at conditions at which borrowers with good projects still take out loans, which prevents
a market breakdown. In particular, the borrower chooses the largest transparency level that
does not lead to a market breakdown, e = e˜. Doing so results in an expected utility of W (e˜) and







Figure 3: The Optimal Level of Transparency.
the spot market (see Figure 3).21
The key insight from our model is that borrowers may have an incentive to voluntarily
restrict information disclosure and that this incentive is stronger in situations where there are
strong exogenous constraints on information disclosure (E is low). Put differently, there is
a fundamental convexity in the returns to information disclosure. If a borrower can enable
an informed lender to distinguish between projects of different quality with high precision, he
should always try to do so. But if disclosure is bound to be imprecise anyway due to technological
constraints, it may be optimal to make even less information available.
This is consistent with the observation that in the run-up to the recent financial crisis, claims
were frequently structured in ways that made them highly intransparent and that this practice
was particularly common in market segments that we would expect to be always subject to
non-negligable informational asymmetries. In particular, 45% of the collateral that backed Col-
lateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), which were widely believed to be highly opaque financial
products, consisted of subprime mortgages (Fender, Tarashev and Zhu, 2008). We would expect
a bank to be unable to disclose the precise value of any portfolio of subprime mortgages to out-
side investors, e.g. because it has private information about its underwriting standard. Hence,
if the bank wants to raise funds by selling claims on these mortgages to an outside party, it may
21We can show that E˜ > eˆ. In Section 3.2 a borrower faced the choice between an ex-ante contract that
makes use of the lender’s information but leads to a breakdown of the spot market and a contract that does not
condition on any information at all. Now the borrower only needs to reduce the amount of information disclosure
in order to avoid a market freeze. Hence, preventing a market breakdown becomes less costly. The borrower can
enjoy a utility of W (e˜) instead of W (0) and will choose to prevent a market breakdown more often.
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prefer to make even less information available by packaging these products in CDOs. Our model
may help us explain why these claims were structured in an opaque fashion. However, we do not
attempt to look at the consequences that this opacity may have on financial stability.
In relation to the existing literature on opacity, our key contributions are twofold. First, we
show under which circumstances opacity is likely to be optimal. This is important in order to
understand why opacity was common in the subprime mortgage market, while it is arguably
less common in other markets. Second, we show that opacity can be optimal even if it increases
informational asymmetries between contracting parties. While the borrower always learns his
type perfectly, opacity reduces the amount of information that an informed lender receives.
Moreover, in equilibrium uninformed lenders know that they lend only to those borrowers who
received an unfavorable evaluation. The less precise the information of an informed lender, the
less an uninformed lender can learn from the fact that he is trading with a particular borrower.
Nevertheless, a positive amount of opacity may be optimal because it reduces the stigma of
those borrowers who have to resort to a spot market for credit. This effect is very different from
the model considered by Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2009) where opacity is optimal since it
reduces informational asymmetries.
Part II: Government Intervention and Market Support
We have seen that the danger of a market breakdown can have considerable efficiency costs.
Either asymmetric information does indeed lead to a freeze of the spot market and prevents the
best projects from being set up at a large scale. Or borrowers reduce transparency in order to
prevent a market breakdown, which comes at efficiency costs of its own. In this part we consider
how the government can intervene in ways that keep the spot market liquid. The government
interventions we consider are a stripped-down version of Tirole (2012) and resemble the original
plans for the Troubled Asset Relief Program discussed by the US government in 2008. We
refer to such interventions as ’market support’. Our key contribution is to analyze how such
interventions affect the ex-ante incentives for information disclosures. The model of opacity
that we have presented above offers a good setting to do so. In this model borrowers voluntarily
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restrict the amount of information they disclose, so there is scope for policy interventions to
increase (or, in theory, decrease) information disclosure.
We extend our baseline model in the following way to allow for government interventions.
Before uninformed lenders make their offers, a government can enter the spot market and acts
like an ordinary (uninformed) lender by publicly offering to purchase claims at an interest rate of
rG.
22 Subsequently, uninformed lenders post rM . Once both rates have been posted borrowers
who are in need of spot market funding decide which offer to accept (if any) and make their
investments. We assume that the government sets this interest rate so as to maximize social
surplus and does not have to make zero profits, since it can use tax revenues to cover losses
incurred on the spot market. However, taxation creates a deadweight-loss of λ − 1 > 0. The
precise timing is shown in Figure 4.
1) B chooses e.
2) B signs ex-ante contract.
1) B observes i.
2) Lender observes s.
3) Lender announces sˆ.
1) Government announces rG.
2) Uninformed lenders announce rM .
3) B accepts spot market offer (if any).
4) B invests.
Projects mature.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure 4: Timing of the Game with Government Interventions.
As before, a borrower can not pledge any income to more than one lender, so the maximal
amount of credit he can obtain from the government qG is implicitly defined by
(
A+ qsˆ + qM + qG
)
ρp = d
sˆ + qMrM + qGrG.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that there is a continuum of ex-ante identical
borrowers. This is not essential for any of our results but simplifies exposition.23 Moreover, we
assume that the distortive cost of taxation is sufficiently high:
22We can show that offering a single, linear interest rate rG at which borrowers can obtain credit from the
government is indeed an optimal mechanism if the government can not limit borrowers’ access to the spot market.
23If there is a continuum of borrowers the government will fund a deterministic mass of projects rather than
funding an individual borrower with a certain probability.
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Assumption 3. The cost of public funds is not too low:




Assumption 3 implies that even if the government could be perfectly sure to face high types,
public funds are too expensive for the government to want to transfer wealth to borrowers uncon-
ditionally. Any intervention that ensures the liquidity of the spot market involves some degree
of transfers from the government to borrowers. This assumption allows us to to concentrate on
the interesting case where there is a trade-off between subsidizing borrowers and preventing a
spot market freeze.
Proposition 4. The government only considers intervening if the spot market would otherwise
break down. If it intervenes, it offers an interest rate of rG = 1/θ˜M . Uninformed lenders offer
the same interest rate rM = rG and a share α˜M of the projects that are financed by private
lenders is of high quality, where








(θH − θL) .
Proof. See the appendix.
As a consequence of Assumption 3 the government does not have any incentive to subsidize
borrowers by offering particularly low interest rates. It will only consider intervening if doing so
is necessary to prevent a spot market breakdown. Moreover, if it intervenes it offers an interest
rate that is just low enough to induce all borrowers to trade on the spot market, rG = 1/θ˜M .
Whenever both commercial lenders and the government are active on the spot market, we must
have rM = rG since borrowers must be indifferent between taking money from the government
or commercial lenders. Finally, if commercial lenders find it optimal to offer the same interest
rate as the government the quality of claims offered to these lenders must be α˜M , which ensures
that commercial lenders make zero profits.
Key to the existence of the equilibrium is that borrowers are indifferent whom to accept
funding from, so the distribution of borrowers across lenders is not pinned down by the borrow-
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ers’ individual rationality constraint. In equilibrium, the projects that the government funds
are of lower quality than the ones that are financed by commercial lenders. The government
incurs losses, while uninformed lenders offer the same interest rate and make zero profits. The
government effectively subsidizes trade on the spot market, which keeps the market liquid.
There are a large number of distributions of borrowers across lenders that ensure that a
share α˜M of the projects that are financed by private lenders is of high quality. One particular
distribution is the following. The government funds only bad projects. Moreover, the number of
projects that it funds is just sufficient to ensure that a fraction α˜M of the remaining projects is













each borrower that it trades with. It is easy to see that the number of (bad) projects that are
funded by the government is decreasing in the share of good projects on the spot market αM (e).
In addition to the equilibrium sketched in the paragraph above, there is a large number
of other equilibria which differ with respect to the probability with which a given borrower
sells claims to the government.24 However, all of these equilibria result in the same aggregate
allocations. Hence, concentrating on the equilibrium described above is without loss of generality.
In this equilibrium, borrowers trade with the government as rarely as possible.
Commitment Solution
We start by considering the case where the government announces an intervention policy before
borrowers choose e and is able to commit to it. Without loss of generality, we assume that an
intervention policy simply consists of a set of transparency levels for which the government will
keep the spot market liquid by offering to buy claims at an interest rate of rG = 1/θ˜M .
The cost of an intervention is increasing in the level of transparency. Since for higher levels
of e the average quality of claims on the spot market is lower, the government has to purchase
more bad claims at a loss to ensure that the average quality of claims offered to commercial
24We could shift any random set of borrowers from the commercial lenders to the government. This would
not affect the quality of the remaining projects on the spot market and hence rM . In particular, there exists an
equilibrium in which the spot market is inactive and all borrowers that are not funded by an informed lender
obtain funds from the government. While in this equilibrium we may have rG < rM , the equilibrium would have
the same consequences for welfare as the one we consider.
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lenders is α˜M and that the spot market remains liquid. Hence, a government might want to
announce a maximal level of transparency e for which it is prepared to offer market support.
However, it turns out that this is never the case.
Proposition 5. Assume the government can commit to an intervention policy. It offers market
support regardless of borrowers’ choice of transparency if the cost of public funds λ is weakly
below λ
c
(E). Otherwise it does not offer any intervention at all. Whenever the government does
offer market support, borrowers choose the maximal feasible level of transparency e = E.
Proof. See the appendix.
A borrower who wants to ensure that the government intervenes will will always choose the
highest e for which the government is prepared to step in. A higher level of transparency allows
a borrower to benefit from more advantageous conditions if he obtains funding from an informed
lender. If, however, he needs to turn to the spot market, he can borrow at an interest rate of
1/θ˜M regardless of e. This implies that the government can effectively choose the level of e that
borrowers implement by announcing an appropriate maximum transparency level. Moreover,
while the fiscal cost of an intervention is linearly increasing in e, the borrowers’ utility is convex
in e. Hence, for larger values of e an intervention becomes increasingly attractive from a social
perspective and whenever the the government chooses to offer an intervention, it intervenes
regardless of e.
However, we still have to consider whether the government finds it optimal to offer market
support at all. Recall that absent any government intervention, a borrower chooses limited
transparency in order to guarantee the integrity of the spot market if and only if E ≤ E˜. In this
case, the government is prepared to intervene whenever the benefits of increases transparency






























(E) denotes the highest cost of public funds for which this condition is satisfied.
Now, consider the case where E > E˜: If the government decides not to intervene, borrowers
choose maximal transparency and the spot market freezes. In this case an intervention does
not affect the level of transparency that borrowers choose, but it prevents a market breakdown.





















Again, the threshold λ
c
(E) denotes the level of λ for which the condition is satisfied with
equality. Note that in case E > E˜ the benefit of an intervention is restricted to borrowers with
bad projects who end up on the spot market. High types who end up on the spot market receive
a utility that is equal to the one they could obtain by borrowing at a rate of 1/θ˜M regardless
of whether the government intervenes or not. For this interest rate they are indifferent between
taking out a loan or choosing self-financing. But the participation of high types in the spot
market has a positive externality on low types who are now able to borrow at a considerably
lower interest rate.
Henceforth, we will call an intervention “unconditional” if the government is prepared to
offer market support regardless of a borrower’s level of transparency and “conditional” other-
wise. More generally, we will refer to an intervention as “larger” if borrowers have chosen more
transparent financial structures, since in this case the government needs to buy a larger number
of claims in order to keep the spot market working.
No Commitment Solution
Let us now consider the problem faced by a government that lacks commitment power. In this
case the government can not convince borrowers that it will follow any policy that is not ex-post
optimal. Hence, without loss of generality we can assume that the government only decides to
intervene once borrowers have chosen their level of transparency e. The key difference to the case
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where the government has commitment power is that now, borrowers can strategically choose
their level of transparency in order to affect the government’s decision whether to intervene or
not. In the case with commitment power, this decision was taken by the government ex-ante
and could no longer be influenced by the borrowers.
Proposition 6. Assume the government can not commit to an intervention policy. It ensures















If E ≤ E˜ borrowers always choose the highest level of transparency that induces the government
to intervene. If E > E˜ borrowers choose the highest level of transparency that induces the
government to intervene if λ ≤ λ
nc
(E) and choose maximal transparency otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
The government will always be prepared to intervene if borrowers have chosen sufficiently
low levels of transparency, i.e. Eˆnc > e˜. If the level of transparency is sufficiently close to e˜, the
government only has to buy an arbitrarily small number of bad claims at a loss in order to prevent
a full-scale market freeze. For low costs of public funds the government will even be prepared
to intervene regardless of the level of transparency that borrowers have chosen (Eˆnc > E).
However, Eˆnc is decreasing in λ and for higher values of λ the government will only be prepared
to intervene conditionally on the borrower not having chosen too high a transparency level.
In order to determine whether the government will end up intervening in equilibrium we
now have to consider the question of which level of transparency borrowers actually choose to
adopt. Let us first look at the case where E ≤ E˜ and absent any government intervention
a borrower would choose to limit transparency in order to guarantee the integrity of the spot
market. A government intervention allows borrowers to disclose additional information without
provoking a breakdown of the spot market and borrowers will always choose the maximal level
of transparency for which the government is willing to intervene. If λ is sufficiently small this
may be the maximal feasible level of transparency. However, for larger costs of public funds a





Figure 5: Government Interventions with/without Commitment.
Instead, assume that E > E˜ so absent any intervention, a borrower would choose to disclose
as much information as possible. This allows the borrower to enjoy the benefits that information
disclosure has on allocative efficiency (but results in a freeze of the spot market). In this case
a borrower will only choose to make use of a government intervention if he does not have to
restrict the level of transparency too much in order to do so. This is the case if λ is small and
the government is prepared to intervene even for high levels of transparency. If on the other
hand λ is large, the government can only be induced to offer very limited interventions. If the
borrower preferred to disclose as much information as possible in the absence of a government
intervention, he will still do so now and will not make use of any government support.
The most important difference to the case where the government has commitment power is
that without commitment, the government may end up offering ’conditional’ interventions in
equilibrium.25 The reason why such limited interventions can occur is that they are a direct
result of extortionary practices. By choosing intermediate levels of transparency, borrowers
reduce the cost of an intervention. But more importantly, they increase the cost of a market
breakdown in case the government fails to intervene. If transparency is low, a large number of
high types do not receive funding from an informed lender. If the spot market breaks down and
the government does not intervene, these borrowers do not take out loans, which comes at a high
25Since the government does not announce any intervention policy ex-ante, the term ’conditional’ intervention
may be slightly unintuitive. It refers to the fact that borrowers rationally expect that the government will only
intervene for certain levels of transparency. Hence, there is an implicit conditionality in the availability of an
intervention.
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cost in terms of efficiency. Hence, by making the alternative to an intervention less appealing,
borrowers can force the government into action ex-post.
In order to understand the effect of commitment power in more detail, we can now compare
the the cases with and without commitment power and summarize our results.
Proposition 7. If the government is unable to commit to a policy, it offers weakly larger in-
terventions in equilibrium. Nevertheless, if α is sufficiently large for any E ≤ E˜ there is a
non-empty set λ ∈ [λ, λ
c
(E)] for which the the government offers unconditional market support
even if it can commit to a policy ex-ante.
Proof. See the appendix.
A summary of the optimal policies is given in Figure 5. The dark area depicts situations in
which the government will offer unconditional interventions regardless of whether it has commit-
ment power or not. The dashed area describes situations in which a government would like to
commit to a laissez-faire policy but will end up offering unconditional interventions if it is unable
to do so. The light gray area corresponds to parameter constellations in which a government
that lacks commitment power will end up offering conditional interventions (i.e. Eˆnc < E),
while a government with commitment power does not offer any intervention at all. Finally, the
white area depicts situations in which the government never intervenes in equilibrium.
In order to see that the government will offer weakly larger interventions in equilibrium if it
has no commitment power, let us first consider the case where E ≤ E˜. Absent any intervention,
a borrower would restrict information disclosure. Hence, if a government can commit to an
intervention policy, it will compare the benefits of an intervention to the alternative of limited
information disclosure. However, if the government is unable to commit to a policy, a borrower
can choose to adopt maximal transparency before the government decides on an intervention
policy. Now the government compares the benefits of an intervention to the alternative of a
market breakdown. For E ≤ E˜ a market breakdown is more costly than limiting information
disclosure and a government that lacks commitment power is hence more likely to offer uncon-
ditional interventions than a government that can commit to a policy. Moreover, in case the
government lacks commitment power, it can still be induced to offer small interventions even
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if λ is too high for the government to intervene irrespective of e. By choosing a level of trans-
parency that is sufficiently close to e˜ a borrower can always force the government to offer some
(potentially small) intervention.
Let us now turn to situations where E > E˜. In this case a government will compare the
benefits of an intervention to the alternative of a market breakdown even if it can commit to
a policy. So a government with commitment power will offer unconditional market support if
and only if a government that lacks commitment power would do so. However a government
that lacks commitment power will still be prepared to offer conditional interventions even if
it can not be induced to intervene irrespective of e. Borrowers will choose to benefit from
such interventions whenever the government is prepared to offer sufficiently large interventions
(i.e., if λ is not too large). Conversely, if the government is only prepared to offer very small
interventions, borrowers prefer to adopt maximal transparency and choose to forgo the benefits
of a government intervention.
It is often argued that while supporting financial markets may be ex-post optimal, a govern-
ment might want to rule out interventions ex-ante in order not to create incentives for banks to
rely on such support. Proposition 7 verifies this intuition by showing that borrowers can create
situations in which the government feels compelled to intervene ex-post, even though it would
prefer to commit to a laissez-faire policy ex-ante. But there are still situations in which market
support is optimal even from an ex-ante perspective. Either because government interventions
prevent an inevitable market breakdown. Or because they induces borrowers to disclose more
information, making the financial sector less opaque. The latter effect is particularly interesting,
since it implies that offering market support may be optimal because of the incentives that it
creates ex-ante.26
26Proposition 7 shows that a government finds it ex-ante optimal to intervene if α is sufficiently large, the cost
of public funds is sufficiently low and an intervention increases transparency (i.e., E ≤ E˜). While we do not
provide any conditions for the case where an intervention prevents an inevitable market breakdown (i.e., E > E˜),
interventions may be ex-ante optimal in this case, too.
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Conclusion
We have seen that banks may choose to design purposefully opaque financial claims in order
to limit the amount of information that an informed lender can obtain. If an informed lender
possesses less precise information, there is less of a stigma attached to having to resort to
uninformed lenders. This increases the price uninformed lenders are prepared to pay for claims
they know have previously been rejected by an informed lender and can ensure the liquidity
of a spot market for financial claims. Opacity can have a positive effect on market liquidity
even though it increases informational asymmetries between contracting parties. This insight
contributes to our understanding of why many financial institutions decide to issue opaque claims
or choose intransparent accounting practices even though these practices reduce the financial
sector’s ability to allocate funds towards the most efficient projects.
Most importantly, we have shown that there is a fundamental non-concavity in the returns
to information disclosure. If borrowers can disclose very precise information, they will always
choose to do so. But if information disclosure is bound to be imprecise anyway, borrowers may
find it optimal to make even less information available as to prevent a breakdown of the spot
market for funding. This is consistent with the fact that opaque financial claims were particularly
prevalent in market segments where we would expect claims to be inherently hard to value, such
as the subprime mortgage business.
Finally, we have seen that in a framework where banks optimally choose to be intransparent,
government interventions that ensure market liquidity can have desirable ex-ante effects. If
borrowers expect the government to prevent a market freeze in the future, they are prepared
to disclose more information, which increases the allocative efficiency of the financial sector.
However, there are also situations in which interventions that are optimal ex-post are inefficient
from an ex-ante perspective since banks choose levels of transparency that are excessive from a
social perspective. Hence, in some situations a government may want to commit to a ’no support’
policy. This is consistent with concerns that while government interventions in financial markets
may be optimal ex-post, they may induce market participants to rely on such interventions in
ways that are detrimental to social welfare.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that lenders on the spot market
offer an interest rate in the interval [1/θH , 1/θL] in equilibrium since otherwise they would make
losses (profits) irrespective of the market composition. Hence, borrowers with bad projects will




it is beneficial to take out a loan at an interest rate of 1/θL, it is optimal to do so for all lower
interest rates.
If both types of borrowers decide to borrow on the spot market lenders offer an interest rate
of rM = 1/θˆM (e) = 1/(θL + α(1 − e)(θH − θL)) and make zero profits. Assumption 2 ensures
that for e = 0 high types do indeed borrow on the spot market, while Assumption 1 implies
that they would prefer autarky if e = 1. Since taking out loans becomes monotonously less
attractive in the interest rate there is a unique threshold e˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that high types will
indeed take out a loan on the spot market whenever e ≤ e˜. This threshold is implicitly defined
by A(ρnp + ρpθH) =
ρnpA
1−ρpθˆM (e˜)
. It is easy to verify that for all e < e˜ the equilibrium is unique.
Instead, consider the case where e > e˜. The lowest interest rate that lenders can offer without
making losses is given by 1/(θL + α(1 − e)(θH − θL)). However, for this rate high types will
choose autarky and only low types take out loans. Since lenders have to make zero profits this
implies that in equilibrium they have to offer an interest rate of rM = 1/θL.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, let us show that for any optimal contract, constraint
(6) must be binding. Consider otherwise. In this case the lender could reduce qL by one unit
and dL by ρp units while increasing q
H by 1−α
α










= θH−(1−α)(1−e)(θH−θL). This change of the contract leaves
the profits of the lender unaffected and allows disapproved borrowers to obtain the same amount
of credit on the spot market. Moreover, it relaxes the constraint (7) and the feasibility constraint
(8) for approved borrowers. Finally, it is easy to check that it increases the ex-ante expected
utility of the borrower even if an approved borrower doesn’t take up additional credit on the spot
market. So (6) must be binding. For now, we will ignore condition (7) and we will check at the
end that it is indeed satisfied in our candidate optimum. Substituting the zero profit condition
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In any equilibrium we must have rM > 1/θˆ
H
. Otherwise, it would be optimal to set qL = 0,
disapproved borrowers would borrow on the spot market and uninformed lenders would make
negative profits. This implies that the marginal interest rate that approved borrowers have to
pay when we increase the loan they receive from the informed lender ∂dH/∂qH is strictly smaller
than the interest rate on the spot market. Hence, approved borrowers trade exclusively with
the informed lender and borrow as much as possible. Using the feasibility constraint (8) we













. We can check that irrespective of whether
borrowers with good projects decide to drop out of the spot market or not, the borrower’s ex-ante
expected utility is linear in qL. This implies that the borrower will either choose a contract that

















and dL = dH =
ρp
1−(αθH+(1−α)θL)ρp
A, i.e. the terms of credit are independent of sˆ. It is easy
to verify that both contracts do indeed satisfy condition (7). Without loss of generality we can
assume that uninformed lenders expect the quality of borrowers who are in need of new funding
at t = 1 to be θˆ
L
. While this belief is not uniquely pinned down by rational expectations in
case the spot market is inactive in equilibrium, any equilibrium that can be supported by some
off-equilibrium belief can also be supported by a belief that the expected quality of borrowers
in need of funds is θˆ
L
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us denote the borrower’s expected utility in case he signs a
contract that depends on sˆ and in case both types of borrowers participate in the spot market




















 (θH − θL) > 0 (11)
for all e ∈ [0, 1]. If the borrower signs an ex-ante contract that does not condition on sˆ, his
expected utility is given by WL(0): The utility is the same as if the signal of the informed lender
contained no information at all. In either case the borrower will be offered an interest rate of
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1/(αθH+(1−α)θL) irrespective of s. This implies that it must be optimal to sign a contract that
depends on sˆ for all e ∈ [0, e˜] since in these cases both types of borrowers do indeed participate
in the spot market.
Instead, assume the borrower signs a contract that conditions on sˆ and a borrower with a good
project who ends up on the spot market doesn’t take out a loan. This type of borrower receives a
utility equal to the level he could obtain by borrowing at a rate of 1/θ˜M since for this interest rate
he is indifferent between borrowing on the spot market and choosing autarky. So we can express











αM (1) = 0 and θˆM (1) = θL we get W
BD(1) = WL(1). Hence, if e → 1 it is always optimal to
sign an ex-ante contract that conditions on sˆ instead of signing a contract that does not depend
on sˆ and receiving a utility of WL(0). Next, let us look at the marginal effect of transparency





ρpα(1− α)(θH − θL)(
1− ρpθˆ
H




















 > 0 (12)
Since (12)>(11) there exists some e˘ > 0 such that WL(0) = WBD(e˘). The borrower strictly
prefers a contract that doesn’t depend on sˆ for all e ∈ (e˜, eˆ) where eˆ = max {e˜, e˘}. For these
levels of transparency the spot market does indeed break down and WBD(e) < WL(0). As
θL → (θH/(ρnp + θHρp)− αθH)/(1 − α) we get e˜→ 0 and the interval (e˜, eˆ) is non-empty.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is straightforward and follows along the lines of
Proposition 2. We can easily check that whenever the borrower does not choose maximal
transparency, he will set e = e˜ to maximize the gains from information disclosure while still
keeping the spot market liquid. So we only have to compare the utility W (E) to W (e˜) Since
WBD(1) = WL(1) > WL(e˜), full information disclosure is always optimal if E → 1. By the same
logic as before, there exists some E˜ > e˜ such that WL(e˜) = WBD(E˜). So the borrower restricts
information disclosure if E ≤ E˜ and discloses all information if E > E˜. Since WL(e˜) > WL(0)
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we know that E˜ > eˆ.
Proof of Proposition 4. Borrowers who end up without funding from an informed lender
will accept credit from whoever offers the lowest interest rate. Hence, if the government buys
any claims we must have rG ≤ rM . This requires that rG ≤ 1/θˆM (e) since otherwise lenders
could make a profit by marginally undercutting rG. Since commercial lenders always make zero
profits and borrowers take out loans at an interest rate of rG, any equilibrium with a given rG
results in the same welfare and the same losses incurred by the government. So w.l.o.g. we can
assume that all borrowers on the spot market trade with the government.
Let us show that conditional on spot market liquidity, the government offers the highest
possible interest rate since it has no incentive to subsidize borrowers. Assume the spot market




































This is positive whenever λ >
ρnp
1−θˆM
, which is true by Assumption 3. Similarly, we can show
that conditional on a spot market breakdown the government still offers the highest possible
interest rate. This implies that the government will only offer an interest rate that is different
from the one that prevails without any intervention (i.e., rG < 1/θˆM (e)) if the spot market would
otherwise break down. If the government intervenes in such a way, then it offers the highest
interest rate that does not jeopardize spot market liquidity: rG = 1/θ˜M . Commercial lenders
have no incentive to undercut the interest rate offered by the government and an equilibrium
where the government buys all claims does indeed exist.
However, it is easy to see that there are also equilibria in which private lenders purchase a
positive amount of claims and offer an interest rate of rM = rG. In these equilibria a subset of
borrowers with an expected quality of θ˜M sells claims to commercial lenders and these lenders
make zero profits. The losses incurred by the government remain unaffected.
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Proof of Proposition 5. It is easy to see that a borrower who wants the government to
intervene always chooses the highest level of transparency for which the government is prepared
to intervene. For any e ∈ [0, e˜] the government is inactive and we already know that the borrowers
utility is increasing in e. Moreover, for all e up to the maximal level for which the government
is willing to intervene, the borrower’s expected utility is increasing in e, too. A higher level of
transparency results in more attractive conditions offered by informed lenders while the interest
rate on the spot market is 1/θ˜M and does not depend on e.
This implies that the government can effectively choose the level of e that borrowers imple-


























Using the fact that θˆ
H
(e) = θH−(1−α)(1−e) (θH − θL) we can easily see that the optimisation
problem is globally convex: While the cost of larger market interventions is linear in e, the benefit
of increased transparency is convex. So the government will either not intervene at all, or it will
offer market support for all e ≤ E.
Since the government is prepared to intervene regardless of the level of transparency we do
not have to consider whether the borrower does indeed want to make sure that the government
intervenes.
In order to derive the conditions under which the government is willing to offer market
support, we have to compare the losses the government makes in case of an intervention to
the change in the expected utility of borrowers. In case the government doesn’t intervene
and E ≤ E˜ borrowers would voluntarily restrict information disclosure in order to ensure that
the spot market for debt does not break down. So the condition for an intervention is given
by equation (9). If on the other hand E > E˜ borrowers would choose to disclose as much
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information as possible in case the government announces not to intervene. In this case the
condition for an intervention is given by (10). In either case we can solve for a threshold λ
c
such
that the government intervenes if and only if λ ≤ λ
c
.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that borrowers have chosen a level of transparency e > e˜,
i.e. absent any intervention the spot market would freeze. The government intervenes whenever




















The benefit of an intervention is restricted to low types who end up in need of new funds.
Approved borrowers will still receive credit from their informed lender and high types that end
up on the spot market receive the same level of utility no matter if they choose autarky or if they
borrow at an interest rate of 1/θ˜M . The cost of an intervention on the other hand is given by
the share of claims that the government needs to buy times the loss that it makes on each claim.
We can check that there exists a lower bound on αM (e) that guarantees that a government will
be prepared to intervene if and only if αM (e) is larger than this lower bound. Solving for αM (e)
gives us the expression given in the proposition. Since αM (e) is decreasing in e, the lower bound
on αM (e) translates into an upper bound on e which we denote by Eˆ
nc. Since α˜M < 1 it is easy
to see that Eˆnc > e˜.
By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 5, the borrowers expected utility is
increasing over the interval [0, Eˆnc]. Moreover, while the borrower’s expected utility drops dis-
continuously once he chooses e > Eˆnc and no longer benefits from an intervention, his expected
utility increases monotonically again over the interval (Eˆnc, E]. So the borrower will either



















where again we use the fact that under a market freeze high types that end up on the spot
market receive the same utility as if they were to borrow at a rate of rM = 1/θ˜M .
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Since Eˆnc > e˜ we know that for all E ≤ E˜ the borrower will indeed prefer to choose e = Eˆnc.
However, in case E > E˜ the condition is satisfied if and only if Eˆnc is sufficiently close to E.
Since Eˆnc is decreasing in λ this will be the case whenever the cost of public funds is sufficiently
low.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the case where E ≤ E˜. By the definition of E˜ we know











































So whenever (9) is satisfied, equation (13) is satisfied for e = E, too. Hence, whenever a
government with commitment power offers (unconditional) interventions, a government that
lacks commitment power will do so, too. Moreover, a government that lacks commitment power
may intervene even if a government with commitment power does not find it optimal to do so.
In case E > E˜ a government with commitment power will intervene if and only if condi-
tion (10) holds. This condition coincides with (13) evaluated at e = E. So a government with
commitment power will offer unconditional interventions if and only if a government without
commitment power will do so. While under some circumstance a government that lacks com-
mitment will offer interventions that are limited in size, a government with commitment power
will never offer such conditional interventions.
We can easily check that the threshold λ
c





order to show that λ
c




In the limit the intervention needed to ensure market liquidity becomes arbitrarily small and


































)2 1(ρnp + θHρp) > λ.
So there exists an α < 1 such that λ
c
(E) > λ for all E ∈ (e˜, E˜].
B Screening contracts
In Section 2 we assumed that informed lenders do not offer screening contracts, i.e. for any
report sˆ they offer a unique set of payments (qsˆ, dsˆ). We now relax this assumption, but we
assume that whenever both types of borrowers are indifferent between two terms of financing,
they will accept the same terms. We will show that under this tie-breaking rule there is indeed
always an optimal contract in which for a given report sˆ all borrowers accept the same terms
(irrespective of i). Hence, the assumption that the lender offers only one set of payments for
each sˆ is without loss of generality.
Without loss of generality we assume that for a given report sˆ the informed lender asks the






L) at t = 1 where in equilibrium
a borrower with i = H chooses the first option and a borrower with i = L chooses the latter
one. Whenever rM ≤ 1/θ˜M all borrowers complement their contract with credit taken up on the
outside market and pledge all of their future earnings to lenders. This implies that their utility
is independent of i for any given option. It follows that each types i must receive the same level
of utility for both options. Given our tie-breaking rule, this implies that both types must accept







Let us now assume that rM > 1/θ˜M . In this case only low types take out extra credit on
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the spot market, while high types receive a strictly larger expected utility by not pledging any
of their income to uninformed lenders. This implies that lenders may be able to implement
separation by offering contracts that restrict the amount of credit granted to borrowers who
claim to be of type i = H. Any such contract must satisfy the following incentive compatibility
constraints:
(qsˆH +A)ρnp + θH
[




≥ (qsˆL +A)ρnp + θH
[






















for all sˆ ∈ {H,L}. If we simplify these constraints and take into account that an informed lender
has to make zero profits and has to have an incentive to announce his signal truthfully, we get











































































































In order to show that there exists a pooling equilibrium in case rM = 1/θL we proceed in
three steps: Step 1): Conditions (14) and (15) (or, equivalently, (16) and (17) ) can be re-
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(ρnp + θHρp) <
θH
θL








Step 2): For now, we will assume that (19) is always satisfied. We will check at the very end
that (19) is indeed satisfied in our candidate optimum. Assume that (14) is not binding. In this
case the lender could reduce qHL by one unit and d
H










ρp units. This change increases the borrower’s expected utility while
leaving (18) and (20) unaffected. Moreover, the proposed change relaxes condition (15). This
implies that (14) must be binding for any optimal contract. Similarly, assume that (16) is not
binding. In this case the lender could reduce qLL by one unit and d
L









ρp units. This increases a lender’s expected utility while
leaving (20) unaffected. Moreover, the proposed change relaxes (18) and (17).
Step 3): Let us now reduce qsˆL by one unit and d
sˆ
L by rM units. This leaves conditions (14)
and (16) unchanged and since rM = 1/θL conditions (18) and (20) remain unaffected, too. So
the change does not influence the borrower’s expected utility and is feasible unless (15) and (17)
become binding. This will be the case when qsˆH = q
sˆ




H . Moreover, in Section







is satisfied. So we can replace any contract by a contract that does equally well and has both
types i obtain the same terms of financing.
Informed lenders can always hand out less credit to low types and have them take out more
credit on the spot market instead. In case of a market breakdown lenders on the spot market
make zero profits when dealing with low types. Hence, the informed lender can change the ex-
ante contract in a fashion that leaves both, the utility of low types and his own profits for any
given announcement sˆ constant. So the reduction in qsˆL does neither affect the informed lender’s
profits, nor his incentive to reveal his information truthfully. This implies that the informed
lender might as well offer the same amount of credit to high and low types. However, incentive
compatibility on the side of the borrower implies that in this case the repayments have to be
the same for both types, too, and we end up with pooling between different types that received
the same signal s.
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